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POSTSCR IP T 1 : THE TIME OF P LA CE 
 
David Uzzell 
 
 
 
THE CASE STUDIES IN THIS VOLUME E MPHASISE F ORCEFULLY THAT PLACES  
have meanings, and these meanings change over time. They change simply 
because of time – they leave the memory of those who witnessed the events, and 
who then told their stories to their families and communities. In this telling of 
stories memories change, the interplay between recollection and emotion shifts, 
and the function and purpose of stories change to serve particular arguments 
in particular contexts. These stories are passed down to subsequent generations 
and are further transformed, and eventually they seep into history. But these 
transformed meanings are subtle and multifaceted. 
In this volume references are made to the ‘biography of place’. Places 
tell stories, they speak to us through the landscape before our eyes and such 
place-related stories are especially powerful when the landscape is one of 
memorialisation. Place-based stories provide a direct link between individuals 
and the environment: “Within this understanding was interwoven an embodied 
sense of visiting the actual physical place, a place where the soil had been soaked 
in blood and tears” (Sørensen and Adriansen this volume). 
 
LOOKING BACK TO LOOK FORWARD  
 
Events and memorials, which are designed to be a vehicle for remembering and 
reconciliation, serve in many cases to keep alive the memories of conﬂict, 
grievance, injustice, and pain. They also demonstrate, however, that it takes 
two to create conﬂict, and both parties suﬀ er and their pain is a shared 
experience. The legacies of war, both memories in the mind and material 
remains in the physical environment, are an important component of the 
reconciliation process. For example, former French President Nicolas Sarkozy 
(at the Arc de Triomphe on Armistice Day 2009 in the presence of German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel) made an emotional reference to the bonding 
between the two countries through their shared suﬀ ering, and the fact that 
German children had cried for their dead fathers in exactly the same way as 
French children had. Sarkozy’s reference to that most painful of 
reﬂections, ‘lost children’, reminds us of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s powerful 
tribute sent to an oﬃcial Australian, New Zealand, and British party visiting 
 
1251 
                                                          
1 Uzzell, D. (2015) ‘The Time of Place’, in Sørensen, M. L. S. and Viejo Rose, D. (Eds) War and Cultural Heritage:  
Biographies of Places, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 251 – 260. 
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Anzac Cove in 1934, a tribute which is reproduced on the memorial to the 
Anzacs killed at Gallipoli in 1915: 
Those heroes that shed their blood and lost their lives. . . . You are now 
lying in the soil of a friendly country. Therefore rest in peace. There is no 
diﬀerence between the Johnnies and the Mehmets to us where they lie 
side by side now here in this country of ours, you, the mothers, who sent 
their sons from faraway countries wipe away your tears; your sons are now 
lying in our bosom and are in peace. After having lost their lives on this 
land, they have become our sons as well.
1
 
Atatürk’s speech, like that of Sarkozy 75 years later, has to be set within a wider 
political context. William ‘Billy’ Hughes, Prime Minister of Australia during the 
First World War, said: “Australia was born on the shores of Gallipoli.” One might 
perhaps suggest that Turkey was too; Kemal Atatürk, who distinguished himself 
at Gallipoli, played a key role in the Turkish War of Independence and went on 
to become the ﬁrst President of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. 
Emotional penances, which seem to be looking back in sorrow, are often 
looking forward to a future. Sarkozy also used the occasion for remembrance to 
talk about a closer co-ordination of economic and energy polices and plans for 
the appointment of a Franco-German Minister. On 7 December 1970, Willy 
Brandt knelt down at the monument to the Warsaw Uprising (the Kniefall von 
Warschau), a penitential gesture which almost 50 percent of the German pop- 
ulation thought was ‘exaggerated’ (Der Spiegel 1970), but which was seen by 
Brandt as a symbolic sign central to his policy of Ostpolitick. And on 22 
September 1984, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl held hands with French 
President François Mitterrand in front of the Ossuary at the Douaumont 
cemetery in Verdun. This gesture was not only meant to signal reconciliation 
between two men to events in the past, one whose father had fought at Verdun 
(Kohl) and the other who had fought over the same ground in the Second 
World War. It was also a statement about the future, about the ‘European 
Project’ and France and Germany’s position at the centre of it. 
These examples do not seek to denigrate such acts as cynical posturing, but 
we should not become too misty-eyed and ignore the fact that the memoria- 
lisation of the past can be functional serving future economic interests, massag- 
ing the collective memory, and healing past psychological scars. 
 
MEMORY  IN  CONTEXT  
 
These observations remind us how the meanings of memorial sites are simulta- 
neously located in the individual, their identities and group allegiances, in those 
local communities which look out every day across a landscape that saw death 
and destruction, and in the larger social, political, economic, and historical 
contexts in which individuals, families, and communities live. 
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The oral historian Allesandro Portelli (1991) recounts his experience of 
interviewing elderly resistance ﬁghters who opposed the Fascists in 
Genzano near Rome. The men arranged themselves for the interview by 
seniority in terms of political experience rather than age. The ﬁrst speaker 
talked about life in the village under German occupation and Allied bombard- 
ment. The next speaker set his account of anti-Fascist resistance farther back in 
time and described how the villagers were dependent upon the underground 
organisation of the 1920s and 1930s. The third speaker talked about how 
resistance was not possible without the pre–First World War socialist tradition 
and electoral successes. The ﬁnal speaker traced his village’s revolutionary 
tradition back to the riots in response to Pope Pius IX’s visit to the town in 
1848. Our narratives of the past are shaped by memory and history, which in 
turn at least partially explain who we are and how we have got to where we 
are. Even for these men seemingly shared and well-known events and places 
meant diﬀ erent things. 
For Portelli, time has both a quantitative and a qualitative dimension. He 
conceptualises these quantitative and a qualitative dimensions as two axes. Its 
quantitative dimension refers to the accumulation of experience. This presents 
time as linear, divided into events, periods, and epochs in a horizontal fashion – a 
temporal plane that stretches from our past into our future. Its qualitative 
dimension, however, is conceived vertically, reﬂecting the multidimensionality 
of our lives and the contexts in which our lives are lived, ranging from the 
personal (i.e., home and the private sphere with the everyday occurrences of 
family events through the life course), the collective (i.e., the life of the 
community, the neighbourhood, the workplace), and the  institutional 
(i.e., the sphere of politics, governments, collective organisations, and set within 
national and international historical contexts). Within any one moment many 
things may take place simultaneously with diﬀerent meanings and signiﬁcances 
for those who experience them. Meaning and memories reside in the horizontal 
and vertical axes of time as well as space. We live through layers of events, which 
simultaneously occupy local places and global spaces, with individual lives part 
of a complex web of relationships that are both ‘here’ and ‘there’. For example, 
the bombing of Gernika was, in Portelli’s terms, not only a personal and 
collective experience but also an institutional event. This point is brought 
out by Dacia Viejo-Rose (this volume) who discusses how the reconstruction 
process after the bombing sought to aﬀect the symbolic meaning of the town. 
Through her analysis of the rebuilding of the Plaza Mayor (Foru Plaza) and 
Ayuntamiento, Viejo-Rose demonstrates how the state lent ‘materiality to its 
authority’ and in so doing aesthetically and symbolically linked the past with 
the present. She also shows how, after the demise of Franco’s régime, 
Gernika was not only reclaimed for itself but was also used for wider 
readings of the meaning of urban spaces and places through various 
international voices. 
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AFTER CONFLICT COMES . . . CONFLICT  
In the opening paragraph to his essay ‘Give War a Chance’, Edward 
Luttwak, the inﬂuential American policy adviser to the U.S. Secretary of 
Defence, the National Security Council, and the U.S. military, argues: 
An unpleasant truth often overlooked is that although war is a great evil, it 
does have a great virtue: it can resolve political conﬂicts and lead to peace. 
This can happen when all belligerents become exhausted or when one 
wins decisively. Either way the key is that the ﬁghting must continue until 
a resolution is reached. (Luttwak 1999: 36) 
The argument advanced by Luttwak is that by prosecuting war to an indisput- 
able conclusion, peace is inevitable. Such a view has to be challenged. 
Following Portelli, the dimensions of time and space are inﬁnite, and there 
can be no winner of wars. From a more immediate perspective the end of 
war is rarely and smoothly transformed into a condition of peace, as if 
conﬂictual states are binary. War mutates into a more managed state of 
conﬂict in which adversity has to be confronted, negotiated, and 
resolved. Political conﬂicts and internalised animosities rumble on across 
generations and across borders, if only amongst the descendants and diaspora. 
The forgotten detritus of war in terms of altered and scarred landscapes, restored 
trenches at battleﬁeld sites, purposeful monuments and memories and annual 
ceremonies ensure that while they may seek to become symbols of peace and 
reconciliation, memories of war are an ever-constant shadow. In some cases, the 
presence of these physical and mental memorials only serves to ensure that 
peace does not follow war. 
In all the case studies in this volume, the conﬂicts discussed are usually 
bracketed within a speciﬁc time period. But of course the authors of these 
chapters are only too aware that the origins of these conﬂicts have histories 
extending beyond the beginning and concluding dates that normally bracket 
conﬂicts (e.g., Bosnia 1992–1995 and Cyprus 1974). The dates of conﬂicts are 
nominal and represent only the most recent ‘ﬂaring’ of hostilities. Moreover, 
they often have no conclusion, because while there may no longer be open 
warfare, on-going political instability and inter-ethnic tensions remain. 
This complex relationship between place, politics, and ethnicity is well illus- 
trated by a Serb memorial in the village of Kravic´a (about a ﬁfteen-minute drive 
from Srebrenica) to those who had died in the Bosnian War. When the CRIC 
research team visited Kravic´a a member of the Serb community, standing before 
the memorial, recounted his experience of the killings and destruction in his 
village. The memorial, built by the community, incorporates seating for partic- 
ipation in commemorative events and history lessons for children. On the 
opposite side of the road is an older memorial to the Partisans who fought against 
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the fascists in the Second World War. Their spatial proximity and alignment 
immediately ties one story about one moment in the past to a completely diﬀer- 
ent moment. Even though the historical context, causes, and ideologies are 
diﬀ erent and the fact that the Bosnian Muslims were neighbours not invaders, 
the two memorials along with the physical evidence in the local valley of the 
consequences of war in the form of burnt-out houses seem to support on-going 
narratives which are used to justify past, present, and possible future actions. A few 
kilometres away at the Srebrenica-Potocˇari memorial site, the graves of more 
than seven thousand Bosnian Muslims stretch into the distance, forming an arc 
around the ‘Srebrenica- Potocˇari Memorial and Cemetery for the Victims of the 
1995 Genocide’. On the same day as the visit to Kravic´a, standing in this 
memorial, a Bosnian Muslim told his community’s story. 
 
HERITAGE AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR RECONCILIATION? 
This volume raises an important research question: to what degree can heritage 
be used as an instrument for reconciliation? Cyprus may be seen by Europe’s 
tourists as a sunny and relaxed Mediterranean island with good food, wonderful 
beaches, and friendly hosts. Thoughts of war and inter-communal strife are the 
last things on many tourists’ minds as they ﬂick through the holiday brochures, 
even if they are aware that there is on-going conﬂict on the island. Cyprus is 
split in half by the UN-controlled Buﬀ er Zone and guarded by armed troops 
from both Greek and Turkish communities. Sitting precisely in the middle of 
this Buﬀ er Zone is the Ledra Palace Hotel, which, Olga Demetriou (this 
volume) asserts, embodies nothing less than the heritage of the Cyprus conﬂict. 
Following the failure of the Annan Plan (2004) and the continued existence of 
checkpoints, the Ledra Palace has become a symbol of failure. 
Sørensen and Adriansen argue that sites of conﬂict continue to have ‘owners’. 
The war lives on, for example, in Bosnia where each side carries on the conﬂict 
and animosity through its stories, through its memorials, through the burnt-out 
and abandoned houses of those who have been forced to leave either the area or 
even the country, and through the everyday reminders of the shelling such as 
the Sarajevo Roses (i.e., the mortar shell marks on the streets of the city which 
have been ﬁlled with red resin ‘roses’ as an ever-present reminder of and 
memorial to those killed). The memorial rituals in Dresden are now the 
German-wide focus for clashes between the Far Right and the Left, with neo-
Nazis marching on the anniversary of the 1945 Dresden air raid. Gernika’s 
bombing remains totemic of fascist assault and has been capitalised on by 
various factions in the Basque conﬂict. And, as noted above, Verdun 
continues to be an important part of the French and German psyche such that 
more than ninety years after the end of the First World War, two national 
leaders cannot meet there on the day of remembrance and reconciliation. 
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Most languages possess maxims that speak to the therapeutic eﬀ ect of time: 
‘Time heals’ (U.K.), ‘Time is anger’s medicine’ (Germany), ‘Nature, Time, and 
Patience are the three great physicians’ (Bulgaria). But these may be best 
considered as words of comfort rather than prophecy. History is not just what 
comes after politics, but can be the fuel of politics. How can people heal if they 
live in landscapes that are still wounded? People may try to ‘forgive and forget’, 
but time and place are always there to remind the descendants of both victors 
and vanquished of past injustices, brutalities, and pain. Memorials, heritage sites, 
museums, commemorative parades, and ‘recreational’ re-enactments all pick at 
the scabs of the past, and in so doing the wounds left by conﬂict take more time 
to heal and inevitably leave a scar. These sites and practices may seek to honour 
and respect the past, and be part of a reconciliation process, but meaning is 
dependent upon the vantage point. A peace memorial can so easily be seen as a 
blame memorial. 
Are we placing too much responsibility on the heritage to do our reconcilia- 
tion work for us? The markers of war and conﬂict, such as memorials or 
battleﬁeld sites, far from being part of a forgiveness and reconciliation process, 
in fact become sites where old conﬂicts are re-constructed, re-positioned, and 
re-presented. People and places cannot be separated, suggesting that the recon- 
struction of the heritage is as likely to lead to the reconstruction of long-felt 
grievances and injustices as it is to lead to understanding and resolution. Do we 
really imagine that a political peace process lasting just several years can eradicate 
not just the physical but also psychological grievances incubated in some cases 
over centuries? As I write this, the Ulster Protestant Orange Order has just 
completed its annual day of marches (12 July 2013) through the Catholic areas of 
Belfast and Londonderry to commemorate the victory of King William III over 
King James II in 1690; yet again the marches were the scene of inter-communal 
violence, although the rhetoric presented to the outside world is one of a peace 
secured (RTE 2013). 
 
 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS  
 
The central idea that runs through this commentary is that the meanings of war 
and their associated places and spaces change over time. A question that has sat in 
the background throughout these reﬂections is how are these diﬀerent mean- 
ings remembered? 
 
Collective memory: past, present, and future 
Susan Sontag argues that society cannot ‘remember’ because memory is 
embodied and cannot be transferred between people or inter-generationally: 
‘All memory is individual, unreproducible – it dies with each person. What is 
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called remembering is not remembering but a stipulating: that this is important, 
and this is the story about how it happened’ (Sontag 2003: 85–86). 
In contrast, Assman asserts that although autobiographical memories cannot 
be embodied by others, they can be shared with others. They are shared 
through our interaction with other individuals, and through our interaction 
with the material world. That is, they become embodied and embedded in 
speech, in memorials and places, and in commemorative events and thus 
become grounded in the ‘durable carriers of external symbols and representa- 
tions’ (Assman 2008: 49). In this way cultural memories are transmitted across 
societies and generations. But this should not be thought of as a passive process. 
These carriers of external symbols and representations become functional; they 
are used to understand the world and construct ideologies: ‘Ideologies create 
substantiating archives of images, representative images, which encapsulate 
common ideas of signiﬁcance and trigger predictable thoughts, feelings’ 
(Sontag 2003: 85–86). To thoughts and feelings, one can add practices. 
In all of the case studies, the conﬂicts are tied to place; the evidence of the 
conﬂict remains in the landscape. In some cases it may be invisible to the 
outsider, residing solely and deeply in the collective memory. In other cases 
the presence of a memorial may be all that there is to denote the signiﬁcance of 
place, although this alone may be suﬃcient to keep the embers of conﬂict 
alight. In some cases, however, the evidence is all too present as the Cain-
like marks of war in the form of bullet-pocked apartments in Sarajevo or 
burnt-out houses in Srebrenica testify. They testify not only to what has 
happened in the past. For those who were victims of such attacks and have 
been displaced, one suspects these marks are also seen as a forewarning of 
what might happen in the future should they try to return. They are a symbolic 
threat. 
 
Memorial places: past, present, and future 
All the conﬂicts that comprise the case studies have a physical presence in the 
landscape. Today, this does not strike us as being signiﬁcant; we expect to see 
the extant remains of conﬂicts in one form or another. But before and during 
the nineteenth century while the detritus of conﬂict might remain on battleﬁeld 
sites for years, there were not only few memorials to battles, but the burial of the 
war dead was often not systematically memorialised. For the British, it was only 
towards the end of the First World War that the need for the bereaved to visit 
where their relatives had fallen, and perhaps if they were fortunate visit their 
grave, was recognised and made possible. The carnage of the First World War 
and the public’s reaction to the loss of millions led to the establishment of the 
Imperial War Graves Commission in 1917 (Summers and Harris 2007). 
Battleﬁeld visits became popular and have remained so to the present day. 
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Not only do all the sites of conﬂict in this volume have a strong sense of place, 
but they also possess a pervading sense of the ‘Other’. The ‘Other’ is the 
adversary. When talking with the Bosnian Muslim guide at Srebrenica one 
could not fail to have a vivid sense of the Serbian ‘aggressor’. It was not diﬃcult 
to imagine the men and boys being marched through woods and summarily 
executed, not least because we have seen the photographs – the ‘archive of 
images’ to which Sontag refers – of the executions above the grave pits. In 
Verdun, French and Germans soldiers died and are buried in the same place. In 
Nicosia, the Greek Cypriots look across barbed wire to the observation posts on 
the Turkish side of the Green Line and see who the enemy is (and vice versa, of 
course). In each of these cases there is an ‘Other’ which is known and part of a 
felt experience. But will this be so in the future? 
Zygmunt Bauman argues that one of the deﬁning characteristics of modernity 
is the changing relationship between time and space: 
Modernity starts when space and time are separated from living practice 
and from each other and so become ready to be theorized as distinct and 
mutually independent categories of strategy and action, when they cease 
to be . . . the intertwined and barely indistinguishable aspects of living 
experience, locked in a stable and apparently invulnerable one-to-one 
correspondence (Bauman 2000: 8–9) 
One of the implications of this separation for Bauman is that power becomes 
extra-territorial; it is no longer constrained by the friction of space. This is 
perhaps another aspect of Portelli’s assertion that we live through layers of 
events which simultaneously occupy local places and global spaces, and that 
our relationships are both ‘here’ and ‘there’. The instantaneousness of 
communication is partly responsible not only for the shrinking of space but 
also for its irrelevance. For Bauman, the changing nature of power 
relationships is particularly pertinent to the prosecution of war and conﬂict. 
In this age of ‘liquid modernity’ those with power conduct war in a 
completely diﬀ erent way to the manner in which it was fought in earlier 
times. An important characteristic of ‘liquid wars’ is that they are 
undertaken remotely, using the latest technology to both maximise 
infrastructural damage on the enemy and minimise personnel causalities. 
Smart bombs or guided weapons had their origin in the Second World 
War, but were only eﬀ ectively employed on any scale for the ﬁrst time in 
the First Gulf War (1991), and even then only for ‘diﬃcult missions and 
special operations’ (Sample 2003). This kind of technology was 
subsequently used by NATO in the bombing of Serbia in 1999. By the 
time of the invasion of Iraq in 2003, 90 percent of the bombs used in the early 
stages of the conﬂict were smart bombs, and the United States had half as 
many air and ground forces at its disposal as it had deployed in the First Gulf 
War (Sample 2003). 
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The essence of this ‘smart’ technology is that computerised and satellite- 
controlled, shocking, highly damaging, remote, and seemingly placeless 
weapon delivery systems operate at high speed and seek to ‘soften’ and 
terrorise the enemy so that forces on the ground will have a critical and 
lower risk advantage. The introduction of drones into the Afghanistan war 
took the technology one stage further. The objective of the NATO-led 
forces that bombed Bosnia and Serbia was not one of straightforwardly 
gaining territorial advantage. The coalition in fact sought precisely to avoid 
this as it could have led to an even more drawn-out, costly, and damaging PR 
war. But as Sample (2003) goes on to suggest, ‘Preventing bombs from killing 
civilians and destroying infrastructure will pay dividends after the war has 
concluded, by fostering the public support among Iraqis that will be vital for a 
smooth transition to a new leadership.’ Or expressed more potently by 
Bauman: 
[W]ar in the era . . . of liquid modernity .. . is about . . . crushing the walls 
which stopped the ﬂow of new ﬂuid global powers . . . and so opening up 
the so-far barricaded and walled oﬀ  inaccessible space to the operations of 
the other non-military, arms of power. . . . War today,  one may say 
(paraphrasing Clauswitz’s famous formula), looks increasingly like a 
‘promotion of global free trade by other means’. (Bauman 2000: 12). 
Maybe it has ever been thus. As I suggested above, there have been at 
least two previous phases in the memorialisation of war and conﬂict. The ﬁrst 
in which there was little physical memorialisation in the landscape. Collective 
memories were refuelled either by the intergenerational recounting of 
familial stories or academic histories. In the second phase, which is well 
represented by the case studies, there are no shortage of ‘durable carriers 
of external symbols and representations’. 
Are we now entering a third phase? Will the advent of ‘liquid warfare’ with 
its reduced emphasis on territorial acquisition and ground forces break down 
what has popularly been termed the tyranny of time and space and have 
implications for remembrance and reconciliation? Yes, we will have the place 
where the bombs dropped. We will have the scene of the crime, but where is 
the ‘Other’? Where is the adversary that launched the attack? They are 
everywhere and nowhere. They are placeless and timeless. Atatürk would 
not now be able to say the moving words he did without there being an 
‘Other’ who were recognised as ‘heroes that shed their blood and lost their 
lives . . . that . . . are now lying in the soil of a friendly country’. The Johnnies 
and the Mehmets would not be lying ‘side by side now here in this country of 
ours’ and ‘in our bosom and are in peace.’ A knowledge of, and even a 
closeness to, the ‘Other’ may be an important ﬁrst step on the way to a 
more hopeful management of conﬂict and reconciliation. 
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Does the new era of ‘liquid wars’ make remembrance, reconciliation, and 
mourning more diﬃcult? Does it ensure that grievances and feelings of injustice 
are perpetuated? Will there be opportunities for former adversaries to come 
together in the ‘liquid wars’ of the future in order to understand and start to see 
the conditions under which the ‘other’ lived or was forced to act? 
 
NOTE 
1. http://www.anzacsite.gov.au/2visiting/walk_03anzaccove.html. 
